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Abstract 
Since the invention of computers and networks, people have found various ways to attack them. Attacks 
over the years have ranged from using a sledge hammer on a computer, to advanced distributed denial 
of service attacks. This research focuses on computer and network attacks and providing a taxonomy 
of them. This is to help combat new attacks, improve computer and network security and to provide 
consistency in language when describing attacks. A wide range of computer and network attacks are 
examined to provide both a survey of the field and to provide a basis on which to build the proposed 
taxonomy. The proposed taxonomy consists of four dimensions which provide a holistic taxonomy and to 
deal with inherent problems in the computer and network attack field. The first dimension covers the attack 
vector and the main behaviour of the attack. The second dimension allows for classification of the attack 
targets. Vulnerabilities are classified in the third dimension and payloads in the fourth. The taxonomy is 
briefly evaluated and is found to work well, with a few areas that could be improved. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Security threats to computers and networks have been a problem since computers and networks were first 
used. Over the past few decades these threats have increased to the point where almost every computer and 
network is exposed to some form of attack. 
The research covered in this paper is split into two main areas. Firstly, a wide range of computer and 
network attacks are examined and secondly, a taxonomy of attacks is proposed. An attack for the pur-
poses of this research, is an attempt on a computer or network that either damages; discloses infmmation; 
subverts; or denies or steals services. An atta~k does not have to be run from a computer, and may by a 
physical attack as simple as destroying a computer with a sledge hammer. A taxonomy is a systematic way 
of classifting attacks, so that similar attacks are in the same category. A famous example of a taxonomy is 
the animal kingdom classification. 
There are a number of reasons for examining a wide range of attacks. To combat attacks and to provide 
a taxonomy it is necessary to understand them. Also previous examinations of attacks have not covered 
such a wide range. New developments such as the new wave of blended threats and infmmation warfare 
techniques are examined. 
The purpose of the taxonomy is to provide a common means of classifying attacks. Currently attacks 
are often described differently by different organisations. A taxonomy also allows for previous knowledge 
to be applied to new attacks and provides a structured way of viewing them. 
Chapter 2 examines some of the background issues in the field of network and computer attacks. A 
brief histmy is given and previous work is discussed. The motivations for research are also given. 
In the following chapter, network and computer attack methodologies are examined. The attack process 
which most attacks follow is explained first, then a range of computer and network attacks are discussed. 
In Chapter 4, the proposed taxonomy is described. Requirements for the taxonomy are proposed from 
the literature and previous taxonomies are evaluated. The proposed taxonomy is then explained in detail. 
Chapter 5 briefly evaluates the proposed taxonomy. The requirements of the taxonomy are re-examined 
to detennine whether the taxonomy met them. Also some weaknesses and advantages in the taxonomy are 
identified. Finally, future work is discussed. 
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Chapter 2 
Background 
In this chapter, some background to the research topic will be discussed. Firstly, a brief look at the problem 
of computer and network attacks is given. Secondly, computer and network attacks are defined in Section 
2.1. In Section 2.2, a brief histmy of computer and network attacks is given. Section 2.3 discusses some 
of the previous wmk done on attack examinations (previous work on attack taxonomies is given in Section 
4.2), and finally some of the motivation behind this research is explained. 
Since 1999 there has been a marked increase in the number of incidents' reported as statistics from 
the Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center[29] (CERT/CC) show. Figure 2.1 shows 
graphically the number of incidents as reported by CERT/CC over the past eight years. For the first two 
quarters of2003 a further 76,404 incidents have been reported. 
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Figure 2.1: Incidents over the Past Eight Years 
Not only has there been a marked increase in the number of attacks, the sophistication of the attacks 
has also increased. With the increased sophistication, many attacks are now relatively "user-friendly" and 
1 An incident is an attempt at violating seeurity policy, such as attacking a computer or attempting to gain unauthorised access to 
some data. 
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in-depth technical knowledge is no longer required to launch an attack. This has led to the rise of various 
groups of attackers, such as "script-kiddies", who while ignorant of how their attack works, can cause great 
damage. In [ 46], this trend is represented graphically as shown in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2: Attack Sophistication vs. Intruder Technical Knowledge 
Network and computer attacks have become pervasive in today's world. Any computer connected to 
the Internet is under threat from viruses, wonns and attacks from hackers. Home users, as well as business 
users, are attacked on a regular basis. Thus the need to combat computer and network attacks is becoming 
increasingly important. 
2.1 Computer and Network Attacks 
Before examining the types of attacks that can be launched against a computer or network, it is necessary to 
explain what network and computer attacks are. Figure 2.3 shows the relationship between them. Network 
attacks are almost a subset of computer attacks, but some network attacks are outside the computer attack 
domain. 
Computer attacks are attacks aimed at attacking a computer system in some way. This attack may 
involve destroying or accessing data, subverting the computer or degrading its performance. Traditionally 
attacks on computers have included methods such as viruses, w01ms, buffer-overflow exploits and denial 
of service attacks. These methods, and more, are covered in Chapter 3. 
Network attacks are mostly attacks on computers that use a network in some way. A network could be 
used to send the attack (such as a w01m), or it could be the means of attack (such as Distributed Denial of 
Setvice attack). An attack on a computer that requires a network, is a network attack. In general, network 
attacks are a subset of computer attacks. 
However, there are several types of network attacks that do not attack computers, but rather the network 
they are attached to. Flooding a network with packets does not attack an individual computer, but clogs 
up the network. Although a computer may be used to initiate the attack, both the target and the means of 
attacking the target are network related. 
8 
For the purposes of this research, the tetm attack (both for network and computer attacks) is broad 
enough to cover a wide range of attacks, ranging from viruses to physical attacks. The range of attacks is 
discussed in the next chapter. 
Computer 
Figure 2.3: The Relationship Between Computer and Network Attacks 
2.2 A Brief History of Attacks 
Computer and network attacks have evolved greatly over the last few decades. Since computers and net-
works were invented, there has always been the opportunity to attack them. However, over the last 25 years 
attacks have split into distinct categories. New attacks, such as wotms and viruses have been developed and 
attacks have become increasingly complicated. Figure 2.2 shows this trend and shows some of the trends 
in the history of attacks. Some of the more important developments in the history of computer and network 
attacks are discussed below. 
In 1978, the concept of a worm[31] was invented by researchers at the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center. 
Although the original wmm was designed to promote efficient use of computers by searching a network 
for idle computers, the concept was used by Robert Morris to release the first Intemet wmm: The Morris 
Wonn[67]. The first vimses were released in 1981, among them Apple Viruses 1, 2 and 3 which targeted 
the Apple II operating system. In 1983, Fred Cohen was the first person to formally introduce the tetm 
"computer virus"2 in his thesis[33], which was published in 1985. Over the next decade viruses became 
more common and prompted the development of anti-vims tools. 
More recently, new attacks such as denial of service (DoS) and distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks have 
been developed. While DoS attacks such as pulling out the power cord of a computer have been around 
since computers have been invented, new fmms using networks and processes on computers were devel-
oped in the mid 1990s. DDoS attacks were first seen in 1999 with the introduction of a number of tools to 
automate the attack (see Section 3.6.3). 
Two major recent developments in computer and network attacks are blended attacks and information 
walfare. Both have influenced the way in which new attacks are being created and both will shape the 
future of attacks. 
In 2001 a new wave of attacks began where existing attack techniques were blended together. The 
first of the new wave of blended attacks was seen on June 18th 2001 with the release of Code Red[32, 
23]. Blended attacks contain two or more attacks merged together to produce a more potent attack. The 
deadliness of blended attacks soon became apparent, with the damage caused by Code Red, Nimda[24], 
Slammer[27] and Blaster[28]. Slammer becan1e the fastest wmm in history and dramatically reduced 
network performance across the Internet. 
However, blended attacks are not a new fonn of attack. The original Morris worm[38, 67], released 
in 1988, was a blended attack. The MolTis wmm used multiple Unix vulnerabilities to spread. While 
2Science fiction author David Gen·ofd used the te11n in some of his short stories. 
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blended attacks have been around since 1988, the new wave of blended attacks are far more damaging 
and more effective than previous blended attacks. Since Code Red, the number of blended attacks has 
increased. Symantec's Internet Security Threat Report Volume III[69] released in Februmy 2003 found 
that blended threats are the greatest risk to the Internet community and that the potential existed for even 
more damaging blended threats. Months later, Slammer and Blaster wrecked havoc on the Intemet. In the 
following volume[? OJ, Symantec found that blended threats had increased 20% from the last half of 2002. 
The new wave of blended attacks is still gathering momentum. As more vulnerabilities are discovered, 
blended attacks become more common and more damaging. More details on the technical aspects of 
blended attacks can be found in Section 3.11. 
Infmmation warfare is a new and developing area of research. No common consensus has yet been 
reached on what information wmfare is precisely. It is apparent that infmmation wmfare is an evolution 
in the way war is waged. Information warfare is essentially a country using relevant infmmation to attack 
another country or defend itself. Instead of just waging wm· with bullets, infmmation is used as a weapon. 
The attacks used in infmmation warfare are varied. Traditional computer and network attacks are used, 
as well as less traditional attacks such as Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) weapons. Some of the electronic 
means ofinfmmation warfare are discussed in Section 3.8. 
2.3 Previous Examinations of Attacks 
There are many previous examinations of computer and network attacks, including both general and spe-
cific examinations. General examinations cover a range of attacks, as is done in Chapter 3, while specific 
examinations analyse one attack in great detail. 
Work done by Chris Rodgers[64] covers many computer and network attacks with regards to TCP/IP 
networking. His research was canied out in 2001 and provides a good overview of the threats and attacks 
that face TCP/IP networking, as well as attacks such as viruses, wonns, trojans and denial of service attacks. 
The research is still relevant today, however there have been a number of recent developments that need 
to be examined. Rodgers examines the Code Red wmm, which was the first of the new wave of blended 
attacks, but does not examine the blended nature of the wmm. Since Code Red, blended attacks have 
become one of the major threats, and so an examination of these attacks is needed. Fmihetmore, Rodgers 
does not cover a number of attacks such as information warfare attacks and web application attacks. 
Other less extensive examinations exist, such as [ 43]. In [ 43] a general overview of the types of attacks 
that are a threat to Internet security is given, as well as analysis of some of the trends attacks are following. 
The CERT/CC is one of the main organisations studying and cataloguing attacks. The CERT/CC regu-
larly issues advisories and incident reports. Advisories contain in-depth examinations of attacks, including 
prevention and the potential impact of the attack. Other organisations, such as the Symantec Corporation, 
issue similar examinations. 
A number of security mailing lists also discuss and examine attacks on a regular basis. Bugtraq[66] is 
one of the most active and new attacks are presented and analysed via email. Bugtraq is often utilised by 
other organisations, such as the CERT/CC, as a starting point for attack examination. 
For more previous work in examinations of attacks, see the next chapter. The next chapter examines 
a wide range of attacks and throughout the chapter a number of detailed attack examinations are refen·ed 
to. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, previous work in the taxonomy field can be found in 
Section 4.2. 
2.4 Motivation for Research 
There are several motivations for examining computer and network attacks, and proposing a taxonomy 
for them. As mentioned previously, over the past few years, attacks have increased and become more 
sophisticated and so pose a significant threat to computer and network users. It is important that attacks 
are examined closely to help combat them. Also, if a taxonomy is to be proposed, there must be an 
understanding of the attacks that will be classified. 
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A taxonomy of computer and network attacks is useful for a number of reasons. While computer 
and network attacks have become a common occurrence, the language used to describe them is often 
inconsistent. For example, one infonnation body may label an attack a worm, while another may consider 
it a vims. Therefore, there needs to be a common language and classification for discussing attacks. A 
consistent taxonomy should be able to provide this. 
A taxonomy will also allow for the applying of previous knowledge to new attacks. If a new attack is 
identified, and classified appropriately, it should be possible to look at other attacks in the same category 
to get ideas on how to deal with the new attack. 
There are several bodies that will benefit from a taxonomy. Information bodies, Computer Emergency 
Response Teams (CERTs) and advisory bodies will be able to communicate between themselves more 
efficiently using a common classification. When a new attack is discovered, if all interested bodies have a 
common classification, much confusion is avoided. 
II 
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Chapter 3 
Network and Computer Attack 
Methodologies 
The following sections examine some of the types of network and computer attacks. Traditional attacks 
such as viruses and wmms are covered as well as the more recent blended attacks. The categorisation of 
the attacks in this section is based on the first dimension of the proposed taxonomy, suggested in Chapter 
4. It should be noted that many of the attacks described in the following sections are blended and in the 
proposed taxonomy will have classifications in. more than just the first dimension. 
Before examining the different types of attacks, the general attack process will be briefly explained. 
The different network and computer attacks will then be examined, followed by a look at blended attacks. 
3.1 The Attack Process 
There are several distinct stages that make up an attack on a computer or network, from the initial motiva-
tion of the attacker, to the final execution of the attack. In general there are four main stages: 
1. Attacker Motivation and Objectives 
2. Infmmation Gathering!Iarget Selection 
3. Attack Selection 
4. Attack Execution 
Howard has a detailed taxonomy built on attack processes, similar to the above stages. His taxonomy 
is discussed in Section 4.2.3. 
While the focus of this research is on the attack, it is important to briefly explain the attack method. 
An attacker may have many different reasons for launching an attack. Some attackers may simply want to 
test their skills, others may want to prove a point. Motivation will have some impact on what attacks are 
chosen and how they are executed. 
Before launching the attack, the attacker must select a target and gather information. These two ac-
tivities take place either concurrently or consecutively, depending on what the attacker wishes to achieve. 
Infmmation gathering involves extracting useful infmmation from the target network or host, while target 
selection is the choosing of a promising target. During these stages, the attacker will usually use tools such 
as packet sniffers and port scanners to gather infmmation on potential targets. 
Once the attacker has a target and some information on the potential weaknesses of the target, they 
can select an attack that is appropriate. The final stage is the execution of the attack, in which the attacker 
proceeds to launch the attack against the target. 
13 
3.2 Viruses 
Viruses are self-replicating programs that infect and propagate through files. Usually they will attach 
themselves to a file, which will cause them to be mn when the file is opened. There are several main types 
of viruses as identified in [68, 64], which are examined below. 
3.2.1 File Infectors 
File infector viruses infect files on the victim's computer by inserting themselves into a file. Usually the 
file is an executable file, such as a .EXE or .COM in Windows. When the infected file is mn, the vims 
executes as well. 
The Infector Vims is an example of a file infector vims obtained from [65]. The Infector Vims infects 
.COM files in Windows based systems by attaching itself to the end of the target file. Infection occurs when 
the infected file is run with the virus selecting one .COM file in the cunent directory as the target file. 
3.2.2 System and Boot Record Infectors 
System and boot record infectors were the most common type of vims until the mid 1990s. These types 
of vimses infect system areas of a computer such as the Master Boot Record (MBR) on hard disks and 
the DOS boot record on floppy disks. By installing itself into boot records, the vims can run itself every 
time the computer is booted up. Floppy disks are often infected as users tend to leave floppy disks in the 
floppy drive. If left in the floppy drive, o~ reboot the computer may boot from the floppy disk. Thus, the 
virus has a chance to execute. These types of viruses were very common in the early days of personal 
computing. However, with the introduction of more modem operating systems, and virus checks being 
enabled in the Basic Input Output System (BIOS), few of these viruses are being created today. New 
means of propagation, such as the Intemet, are also much more attractive to virus creators. 
3.2.3 Macro Viruses 
Macro viruses are simply macros for popular programs, such as Microsoft Word, that are malicious. For 
example, they may delete infmmation from a document or insert phrases into it. Propagation is usually 
through the infected files. If a user opens a document that is infected, the virus may install itself so that any 
subsequent documents are also infected. Some macro viruses propagate via email1, such as the Melissa 
virus covered in the next section. Often the macro vims will be attached as an apparently benign file to fool 
the user into infecting themselves. 
The Melissa vims[l9, 41] is the best known macro vims. It was released in March 1999, and targeted 
Microsoft Word 97 and 2000. The virus worked by emailing a victim with an email that appeared to come 
from an acquaintance. The email contained an Microsoft Word document as an attachment, that if opened, 
would infect Microsoft Word and if the victim used the Microsoft Outlook 97 or 98 email client, the vims 
would be forwarded to the first 50 contacts in the victim's address book. 
Melissa caused a significant amount of damage, as the email sent by the vims flooded email servers. 
ICSA estimated that Melissa could have caused damage as high as USD $385 million[ 53]. 
The classification of Melissa is interesting. Some consider it a vims, others consider it a worm. Under 
the proposed taxonomy in Chapter 4, Melissa is considered to be a mass-mailing worm with a viral payload. 
However, it is included here as the viral payload is a good example of a macro virus. For more infmmation 
on mass-mailing worms see Section 3.3.1. 
3.2.4 Vh·us Properties 
Viruses often have additional properties, beyond being an infector or macro vims. A vims may also be 
multi-partite, stealth, encrypted or polymorphic. 
Multi-partite vimses are hybrid vimses that infect both files and system and/or boot-records. This 
means multi-partite vimses have the potential to be more damaging, and resistant. 
1 Which makes them type of blended attack. 
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A stealth vims is one that attempts to hide its presence. This may involve attaching itself to files that 
are not usually seen by the user. 
Vimses can use enctyption to hide their payload. A vitus using encryption will know how to dectypt 
itself to mn. As the bulk of the vims is encrypted, it is harder to detect and analyse. 
Some vhuses have the ability to change themselves as either time goes by, or when they replicate 
themselves. Such vimses are called polymorphic viruses. Polymorphic vimses can usually avoid being 
eradicated longer than other types of viruses as their signature changes. 
3.3 Worms 
A wonn is a self-replicating program that propagates over a network in some way. Unlike vimses, worms 
do not require an infected file to propagate. There are two main types of worms: mass-mailing worms and 
network-aware worms. Each of these is covered in more detail below. 
3.3.1 Mass-Mailing Worms 
Mass-mailing wmms are an interesting category as many attacks in this categmy could quite easily be 
classified as a wmm, vitus or both. For the purpose of this research and the taxonomy, a mass-mailing 
worm is a wonn that spreads through email. Once the email has reached its target it may have a payload in 
the fonn of a vims or trojan. 
Email, although it may become a file on its joumey, is more abstract than a file. Therefore, while some 
attacks may use email attachments to send vimses, the attack vector2 is still email. A case could be made 
that a mass-mailing vims categmy would be more appropriate, but the proposed taxonomy attempts to 
use the attack vector as the first means of classification. Therefore, an attack such as Melissa should be 
classified first as a mass-mailing wotm. For more details on classification see Chapter 4. 
3.3.2 Network-Aware Worms 
Network-aware wonns ru·e a major problem for the Intemet. Wmms such as SQL Slammer[27] have shown 
that the Intemet can be degraded by a well written worm. 
Network-aware wonns generally follow a four stage propagation model[l4]. Although this is a gener-
alisation, most network-aware worms will fit into this model. Figure 3.1 shows the four stages of network-
aware wonn propagation from the point of view of a host that is being infected. 
The first step is tru·get selection. The compromised host3 targets a host. The compromised host then 
attempts to gain access to the target host by exploitation. For example, the SQL Slanuner worm exploited 
a known vulnerability in Microsoft SQL Server 2000 and Microsoft Desktop Engine. Once the worm has 
access to the target host, it can infect it. Infection may include loading trojans onto the target host, creating 
back doors or modifying files. Once infection is complete, the tru·get host is now compromised and can be 
used by the worm to continue propagation. 
2 The attack vector is the way in which an attack reaches its target. 
30r the attacker's computer iflhe attacker is releasing the wonn. 
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Host 
Network 
Target Host 
Figure 3.1: The Four Stages of Network-Aware Wmm Propagation. 
3.4 Trojans 
Trojans get their name from the The Iliad by Homer, which describes the battle for Troy. Homer writes 
about how the Greeks created a giant horse, filled it with soldiers, and left it outside Troy. The Trojans, 
thinking it was a gift of su1render, wheeled the horse inside Troy. At night, the Greek soldiers came out of 
the horse and opened the gates for the rest of the Greek army. Troy was quickly defeated. 
Today's trojans work in a ve1y similar way. They will appear to be benign programs to the user, but will 
actually have some malicious purpose. Trojans usually cany some payload such as remote access methods, 
viruses and data destruction. 
Back Orifice 2000[60] is a remote administration tool for Windows created by the Cult of the Dead Cow 
that can be used as a trojan. Back Orifice 2000 (B02K) is intende,d to be used by network administrators to 
manage computers on their network remotely. However, it can be used maliciously. B02K has the ability 
to install itself silently so that the user of the computer is unaware that B02K has been installed. This 
allows attackers to install B02K on a target computer without raising suspicion. Once installed B02K 
provides a back door for the malicious attacker and gives them the following abilities: 
11 Session logging. 
11 Keystroke logging. 
• File transfer. 
• Program installation. 
• Remote rebooting. 
11 Registry editing. 
11 Process management. 
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3.4.1 Logic Bombs 
Logic bombs are a special form of trojans that only release their payload once a certain condition is met. 
For example, a logic bomb might release its payload at a certain time. If the condition is not met, the logic 
bomb behaves as the program it is attempting to simulate. 
3.5 Buffer Overflows 
Buffer overflows are probably the most widely used means of attacking a computer or network. They are 
rarely launched on their own, and are usually part of a blended attack. Buffer overflows are used to exploit 
flawed programming, in which buffers are allowed to be overfilled. If a buffer is filled beyond its capacity, 
the data filling it can then overflow into the adjacent memory, and then can either cmrupt data or be used to 
change the execution of the program. There are two main types of buffer overflows described below. More 
details can be found in [32, 39]. 
3.5.1 Stack Buffer Overflow 
A stack is an area of memory that a process uses to store data such as local variables, method parameters 
and return addresses. Often buffers are declared at the stru·t of a program and so are stored in the stack. 
Each process has its own stack, and its own heap (as explained in the next section). Stack overflows are the 
most common fmm of buffer overflows. 
Overflowing a stack buffer was one of the first types of buffer overflows and is one that is commonly 
used to gain control of a process. In this type of buffer overflow, a buffer is declared with a certain size. 
If the process controlling the buffer does not make adequate checks, an attacker can attempt to put in data 
that is larger than the size of the buffer. This means once the buffer is full, the remaining data being put 
into it overflows the buffer and overwrites the adjacent memmy. An attacker may place malicious code in 
the buffer. Part of the adjacent memory will often contain the pointer to the next line of code to execute. 
Thus, the buffer overflow can overwrite the pointer to point to the beginning of the buffer, and hence the 
beginning of the malicious code. Thus, the stack buffer overflow can give control of a process to an attacker. 
3.5.2 Heap Overflows 
Heap overflows are similar to stack overflows but are generally more difficult to create. The heap is similar 
to the stack, but stores dynamically allocated data. The difference between stack allocated data and heap 
allocated data is shown below: 
#include <stdlib.h> 
int main () { 
char stack_buffer[256li 
char 
return Oi 
fer= (char*) malloc(256 * sizeof(char)); 
The heap does not usually contain return addresses like the stack, so it is harder to gain control over a 
process than if the stack is used. However, the heap contains pointers to data and to functions. A successful 
buffer overflow will allow the attacker to manipulate the process's execution. An example would be to 
overflow a string buffer containing a filename, so that the filename is now an important system file. The 
attacker could then use the process to overwrite the system file (if the process has the colTect privileges). 
3.6 Denial of Service Attacks 
Denial of Service (DoS) attaeks[l8, 26], sometimes known as nuke attacks, are designed to deny legitimate 
users of a system from accessing or using the system in a satisfactmy manner. DoS attacks usually disrnpt 
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the service of a network or a computer, so that it is either impossible to use, or its perfmmance is seriously 
degraded. There are three main types ofDoS attacks: host based, network based and distributed. 
3.6.1 Host Based 
Host based DoS attacks aim at attacking computers. Either a vulnerability in the operating system, appli-
cation software or in the configuration of the host are targeted. 
Resource Hog 
Some host based DoS are designed to use up (hog) resources on a computer. Resources such as CPU time 
and memmy use are the most common targets. For example, a trivial resource hog is the fork bomb. A fork 
bomb simply spawns child processes continually, thus over time, more and more resources are taken up by 
the bomb and its children. A Unix based fork bomb4, written inC, is shown below: 
#include <stdlib.h> 
int main() { 
while(l) { 
fork() i 
} 
return 0 i 
Fork bombs, while ve1y effective, are usually easily detected, either through the marked increase in pro-
cesses, or through logging. They can also be easily prevented by configuring the operating system cmTectly. 
Another type of resource hogs access memmy in certain pattems, so that thrashing5 occurs. 
CPU hogs such as Snork[71], exploit vulnerabilities in the operating system. The Snork attack con-
sumes I 00% of the target's CPU time. Snork also has a network based DoS component that allows Snork 
to reduce network bandwidth for legitimate users by continuously bouncing packets between hosts on the 
network. 
Crashers 
Crashers are a fmm of host based DoS that are simply designed to crash the host system, so that it must 
be restarted. Crashers usually target a vulnerability in the host's operating system. Many crashers work by 
exploiting the implementation of network protocols by various operating systems. Some operating systems 
cannot handle certain packets, and if received cause the operating system to hang or crash. Some examples 
of crashers include Land and Teardrop[l7], and the Ping o' Death[49]. 
3.6.2 Network Based 
Network based DoS attacks target network resources in an attempt to dismpt legitimate use. Network based 
DoS usually flood the network and the target with packets. To succeed in flooding, more packets than the 
target can handle must be sent, or if the attacker is attacking the network, enough packets must be flooded 
so that the bandwidth left for legitimate users is severely reduced. Three main methods of flooding have 
been identified in [26]: 
• TCP Floods: TCP packets are streamed to the target. 
• ICMP Echo Request!Reply6: ICMP packets are streamed to the target. 
4When run on a Gentoo Linux 1.4 box, the fork bomb caused an almost instantaneous lock up. 
5 Where more memory pages are accessed than can fit in the physical memmy. This results in writing and reading memmy pages 
to and fi·om the hard disk repeatedly, which slows the system significantly down. 
6 Essentially "pinging" the target 
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• UDP Floods: UDP packets are streamed to the target. 
In addition to a high volume of packets, often packets have certain flags set to make them more difficult 
to process. If the target is the network, the broadcast address 7 of the network is often targeted. One simple 
way of reducing network bandwidth is through a ping flood. Ping floods can be created by sending ICMP 
request packets of a large size to a large number of addresses (perhaps through the broadcast address) at a 
fast rate. On most modem operating systems, root access is required to run the ping utility in that way. 
3.6.3 · Distributed 
The last type ofDoS attack is perhaps the most interesting. Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks are a recent 
development in computer and network attack methodologies. The DDoS attack methodology was first seen 
in 1999 with the introduction of attack tools such as The DoS Project's Trinoo[36, 21], The Tribe Flood 
Network[ I, 21] and Stacheldraht8[37]. Between February 7 and 11,2000, DDoS attacks were put into the 
spotlight when DDoS attacks were launched at a number of high-profile web-sites, including Ebay.com, 
Amazon.com, Yahoo.com and CNN.com. The DDoS attacks were effective enough to disrupt the web-
sites' operation for several hours. 
DDoS attacks work by using a large number of attack hosts to direct a simultaneous attack on a target 
or targets. A numberofmasternodes9 are used to control a larger number of daemon nodes 10 which launch 
the attack on the target. Figure 3.2 shows the process of a DDoS attack. Firstly, the attacker commands 
the master nodes to launch the attack. The master nodes then order all daemon nodes under them to launch 
the attack. Finally the daemon nodes attack the target simultaneously, causing a denial of service. With 
enough daemon nodes, even a simple web page request will stop the target from serving legitimate user 
requests. 
Daemon Nodes Daemon Nodes 
D Nodes 
Target Server 
Daemon Nodes Daemon Nodes 
Figure 3.2: The Topology of a DDoS. 
3. 7 Network-Based Attacks 
This section describes several kinds of attacks that operate on networks and the protocols that run the 
networks. 
7 Any packets sent to the broadcast address get sent to all hosts on a network. 
8
"Barbed-wire" in German. 
9 Hosts directly controlled by the attacker. 
10Subverted hosts that obey the master nodes. 
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3.7.1 Spoofing 
Network spoofing is the process in which an attacker passes themselves off as someone else. There are 
several ways of spoofing in the standard TCP /IP network protocol stack, including: MAC address spoofing 
at the data-link layer and IP spoofing at the network layer. By spoofing who they are, an attacker can 
pretend to be a legitimate user or can manipulate existing communications from the victim host. 
MAC Address Spoofing 
Medium Access Control (MAC) address spoofing is where the hardware address, that is, the MAC address, 
is changed so that either the attacker's computer is no longer identifiable as theirs, or the MAC address is 
the same as a victim's MAC address. This can be used by the attacker to pretend to be someone other than 
themselves and potentially take over the victim's communications with other computers on the network 
In Linux for example, the procedure is simply: 
bash$ ifconfig ethO down 
ifconfig ethO hw ether 00:00:00:00:00:00 
ifconfig ethO up 
Where 00:00:00:00:00:00 is the new MAC address. In Windows, the procedure is more complicated and 
involves modifying the registry 11 • 
MAC address spoofing is only useful to an attacker if their target is on the same subnet as they are. 
MAC operates at the data-link layer, and so is only used locally. To spoof beyond the local subnet, an 
attacker must spoof at a higher layer, for example the network layer. 
IP Spoofing 
Intemet Protocol (IP) spoofing is similar to MAC address spoofing described above. However, the at-
tacker's IP address is now spoofed. IP address ranges are often used to detetmine whether or not a host has 
access to certain setvices, so through IP spoofing unauthorised access may be obtained. 
IP spoofing is often used to inject commands or data into a existing stream of data between the host and 
other hosts. To completely take over the data stream, the attacker must change the routing tables so that the 
packets are routed to the spoofed host 12 • More infmmation on IP spoofing can be found in [35]. 
3.7.2 Session Hijacking 
Session hijacking is the process by which an attacker takes over a session taking place between two victim 
hosts. The attack essentially cuts in and takes over the place of one of the hosts. Session hijacking usually 
takes place at the TCP layer, and is used to take over sessions of applications such as Telnet and FTP. TCP 
session hijacking involves use ofiP spoofing, as mentioned above, and TCP sequence number guessing. 
To catTy out a successful TCP session hijacking, the attacker will attempt to predict the TCP sequence 
number that the session being hijacked is up to. Once the sequence number has been identified, the attacker 
can spoof their IP address to match the host they are cutting out and send a TCP packet with the cmxect 
sequence number. The other host will accept the TCP packet, as the sequence number is cotxect, and will 
start sending packets to the attacker. The cut out host will be ignored by the other host as it will no longer 
have the conect sequence number. 
Sequence number prediction is most easily done if the attacker has access to the IP packets passing 
between the two victim hosts. The attacker simply needs to capture packets and analyse them to determine 
the sequence number. If the attacker does not have access to the IP packets, then the attacker must guess 
the sequence number. Sequence numbers are generated in three ways[64]: 
1. 64K rule: The initial sequence counter is incremented with a constant value every second, usually 
128 000. 
11 Which if done incorrectly could damage the Windows installation. 
12The spoofed host is the host which has its IP address spooled to the victim host's address. 
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2. Time related generation: The counter is increased at regular intervals by a number oftime-units13 • 
3. Pseudo-random generation: The counter is increased by a pseudo-random number. 
Prediction is easy when the first method is used. The second is significantly harder, while the third is so 
hard that most attackers would not bother trying to predict the sequence 14• 
Once a session has been hijacked, the attacker is able to do a wide variety of malicious activities. For 
example, if a Telnet session has been hijacked, the attacker may be able to access the victim's account. 
Session hijacking is described in more detail in [35, 64]. 
3.7.3 Wireless Network Attacks 
Wireless networks, especially those based on the IEEE 802.11 x standards are growing in popularity. How-
ever, there are a number of inherent weaknesses in wireless networks that are not an issue in traditional 
wired networks. Most wireless networks are not configured securely and usually only require MAC address 
spoofing to gain full access. 
WEP Cracking 
Wired Equivalent Protocol (WEP) is a standard used by 802. 11 x networks to encrypt the data transmitted 
over a wireless network and is widely used. However, the cuJTent version of WEP has a flaw that makes it 
vulnerable. WEP uses a stream cipher15 to provide encryption and this exposes it to several vulnerabilities 
(these are examined in detail in [40]). WEP uses a 24-bit initialisation vector (IV) and so, given enough 
time, the IV is reused for encrypting messages. This reuse can be used to gather infmmation about the 
encrypted messages. Over time a decryption dictionary can be built to allow the attacker to decrypt the 
traffic on the network. Of course, to gain enough infotmation to crack the WEP encryption requires time 
and effort. Fortunately for the war driver, tools exist[62] to automate this procedure. 
An in-depth examination of the problems with WEP can be found in [ 13]. WEP version 2 (WEP2) is 
being proposed to attempt to solve some of the problems with WEP. The interesting thing to note is that 
many of the problems with WEP are also a problem with what will be WEP2. WEP2 uses a 1 04-bit IV, 
which is still vulnerable to some of the attacks mentioned in [ 40, 13]. 
3. 7.4 Web Application Attacks 
Web application attacks are network attacks that are aimed against web applications. Essentially the ap-
plication layer of the TCP/IP protocol stack is attacked. Web applications are mn through a web browser, 
but are more than a simple web site. They are usually connected to a database, or at the least have some 
programs or scripts controlling the web site. An example of a common web application is Internet banking. 
Web application attacks are different to attacks that target nonnal applications, as web applications 
build upon and use network protocols extensively. Described below are a number of ways in which web 
applications can be attacked. One form of web application attack is buffer overflows, which are discussed 
in Section 3.5. 
Cross Site Scripting 
Cross Site Scripting involves embedding a script within a web application. Usually it occurs on pages 
that allow for input, such as a guest book or a web forum. The attacker posts a message that contains 
an embedded script that serves some malicious purpose. For example, the script may prompt other users 
browsing that page for a user name and password. Other threats include session and account hijacking, 
cookie theft, and cookie poisoning. More details can be found in The Cross Site Scripting f'AQ[3]. 
13Time-units vary and are dependent on how they are measured, how high the CPU load is and so on. 
14 Unless they had in-depth knowledge of how the pseudo-random number generator worked and knew the seed value. 
15 RC4. 
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Parameter Tampering 
Parameter tampering is a simple web application attack in which the attacker identifies parameters used to 
drive a web application and modifies a URL header to manipulate the parameters. On a poorly designed site, 
parameter tampering could be used to maliciously modify stored data. To prevent a parameter tampering 
attack, parameters should be checked carefully by the web application before processing them. 
Coolde Poisoning 
Today cookie poisoning is not a large threat, as cookies are usually encrypted. However, it still remains 
a common form of attack. Cookie poisoning involves modifying a cookie so that the web application is 
deceived into giving away sensitive data. It is usually used to steal the identity of a user, so that the web 
application treats the attacker as the victim. Thus, the attacker can access the web application as the victim, 
and can then gain, damage or delete confidential information. 
Database Attacks 
Database attacks are web application attacks aimed at accessing the underlying database that drives the 
web application. The most common fo1m of this type of attack is SQL injection. SQL injection involves 
submitting a request to the web application with SQL commands appended in a way that the web applica-
tion passes them on to the database to be processed. For example, suppose the script mnning the website 
used the following que1y (written in PHP): 
$result = mysql_query 
("SELECT* FROM atable WHERE login='$user' and password='$password'"); 
If the attacker enters a valid user name in the user name field and in the password field enters: 
password' or 'x'=x 
Then the que1y becomes: 
SELECT * FROM some_table WHERE login='username 
and password='password' or 'x'=x 
Thus, the password has effectively been made useless, and the attacker can log on to the database as any 
legitimate user without having to know their passwords. Two more detailed looks at SQL injection can be 
found in [5, 54]. 
Hidden Field Manipulation 
Hidden field manipulation is a very simple way of attacking a web application. The attacker downloads an 
HTML page and modifies hidden fields contained in the page. The attacker then repasts the page to the 
server. Hidden fields may contain important inf01mation such as session IDs and user data. Some hidden 
fields may even contain information such as prices for products being sold through the web applications, 
so it is possible for an attacker to change prices so that they can buy or sell products at a price that benefits 
the attacker. 
3.8 Physical Attacks 
Physical attacks are a f01m of computer and network attack that are often overlooked in the literature. This 
may be due to physical attacks being seen as less of a threat. However, physical attacks are often more 
deadly than other forms of attack and with the rise of interest in Inf01mation Warfare will attract more 
attention. Some f01ms of physical attacks are ve1y basic, such as cutting a network cable. Attacks such 
as these will be examined briefly, while the more advanced attacks involving energy weapons and the Van 
Eck effect will be examined in more detail below. 
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3.8.1 Basic Attacks 
Basic physical attacks on computers and networks can be done by almost anyone. They simply involve 
using low technological means to cause damage or dismption to a computer or network. There are many 
different ways an attack could be carried out in this way, for example: cutting a network cable; damaging 
a computer by hitting it; or using explosives to destroy or dismpt a computer or network. 
Because of the nature of these attacks, they are vety simple to carry out. However, attacks such as 
these are not at all subtle, and if someone carried out such an attack it would be hard for them to remain 
anonymous. 
3.8.2 Energy Weapon Attacks 
There are currently three main types of energy weapon attacks that can be used to attack computers and 
networks: high and low energy radio frequency (HERF and LERF) attacks and electro-magnetic pulse 
(EMP) attacks. While these attacks are more general attacks in that they target the electronics, they are 
devastating when used against computers and network devices. 
HERF weapons focus high energy radio frequency (RF) on a narrow frequency spectmm. HERF can 
be used quite accurately due to the narrow frequency spectrum. The damage caused by HERF weapons 
is due to the concentration of energy on electronic components. LERF weapons on the other hand, use a 
wide frequency spectmm, but with low energy RF. LERF is effective due to the wide frequency range as it 
is likely that the frequencies will match the resonance frequencies of the target's electronic components. 
The Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) effect was first discovered[42] when the United States was testing 
high altitude air burst nuclear weapons. The nuclear blast created a vety powerful, but short, electromag-
netic pulse. When electronic components are exposed to such a pulse, the pulse may create a short transient 
voltage. The voltage produced can be enough to render the electronic components useless. Nuclear ex-
plosions are not the only way to produce an EMP as explained in [51]. EMP bombs can be produced to 
achieve similar results to a nuclear explosion's EMP. 
3.8.3 Van Eck Attacks 
The VanEck effect16 was popularised by Wim VanEck in a paper published in 1985[74]. Before the paper 
was published, it was thought that reconstmcting electromagnetic radiation was very difficult and would 
require expensive equipment and highly trained professionals. VanEck showed that it was possible to use a 
television equipped with an extended antenna and two oscillators to reconstruct the signal from a computer 
monitor. This showed that it was possible for anyone with some electronics knowledge to build such a 
device and use it to obtain data from a wide range of electronics. By using the Van Eck effect, an attacker 
can gain sensitive infonnation from the target computer. However, the attacker can gain much more as 
a recent paper[ 57] showed. By using optical emanations, the attacker can potentially gain access to data 
flowing through network equipment. 
3.9 Password Attacks 
An attacker wishing to gain control of a computer, or a user's account, will often use a password attack[ 50] 
to gain the needed password. Many tools[61] exist to help the attacker uncover passwords. There are 
three ways in which passwords are attacked: by guessing a subset of all possible passwords; by trying all 
possible passwords; or by exploiting the implementation of the password protection. 
3.9.1 Password Guessing/Dictionary Attack 
Password guessing is the most simplest of password attacks. It simply involves the attacker attempting 
to guess the password. This method succeeds more often than would be expected, as many users are 
16This is often refetTed to as a TEMPEST attack. 
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predictable in their password choice. Passwords such as names of family members or pets are common. 
Often the attacker will use a form of social engineering to gain clues as to what the password is. 
A dictionary attack is similar, but is a more automated attack. The attacker uses a dictionmy of words 
containing possible passwords and uses a tool to see if any are the required password. Passwords that are 
English words such as "elephant", will be very quickly discovered with this fmm of attack. 
3.9.2 Brute Force 
Brute force attacks work by calculating every possible combination that could make up a password and test-
ing it to see if it is the conect password. Brute force attacks on passwords are guaranteed to succeed. The 
only question is how long the brute force attack will take to find the con·ect password. As the password's 
length increases, the amount of time, on average, to find the correct password increases exponentially. This 
means short passwords can usually be discovered quite quickly, but longer passwords may take decades. 
3.9.3 Exploiting the Implementation 
Exploiting the implementation involves examining the programs that provide the password protection and 
finding flaws. If the flaw is significant enough it is possible to circumvent the password protection, or 
to reveal the password. For example, Microsoft Word 6.0 password protected files can be decrypted[ 59] 
quickly by using a flaw in the encryption mechanism. 
3.10 Information Gathering Attacks 
As mentioned in Section 3.1, the attack process usually involves infmmation gathering. Infmmation gath-
ering is the process by which the attacker gains valuable information about potential targets, or gains unau-
thorised access to some data without launching an attack. Infmmation gathering is passive in the sense that 
no attacks m·e explicitly launched. Instead networks and computers are sniffed, scanned and probed for 
information. 
3.10.1 Sniffing 
Packet sniffers are a simple but invaluable tool for anyone wishing to gather information about a network 
or computer. For the attacker, packet sniffers provide a way to glean information about the host or person 
they wish to attack, and even gain access to unauthorised information. 
Traditional packet sniffers work by putting the attacker's Ethemet card into promiscuous mode. An 
Ethernet card in promiscuous mode accepts all traffic from the network, even when a packet is not addressed 
to it. This means the attacker can gain access to any packet that is traversing on the network they are 
on. By gathering enough of the right packets the attacker can gain infmmation such as login names and 
passwords 17 . 
Other information can also be gathered, such as MAC and IP addresses and what services and operating 
systems are being run on specific hosts. This form of attack is very passive. The attacker is not sending 
any packets out, they are only listening to packets on the network. 
3.10.2 Mapping 
Mapping is used to gather infmmation about hosts on a network. Infmmation such as what hosts are on-
line, what services are running and what operating system a host is using, can all be gathered via mapping. 
Thus potential tm·gets and the layout of the network, are identified 
Host detection is achieved through a variety of methods. Simple ICMP queries can be used to determine 
if a host is on-line. TCP SYN messages can be used to determine whether or not a port on a host is open 
and thus, whether or not the host is on-line. Host detection techniques are discussed in detail in [6]. 
17Telnet is notoriously insecure in this regard. Telnet sends passwords unenctypted, so if the cotTect packets are captured, the 
password can be extracted. 
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After detecting if a host is on-line, mapping tools can be used to determine what operating system and 
what services are mnning on the host. There are a wide range of techniques that can be used. Simply 
examining the service banners18 may reveal the operating system. More advanced techniques include 
analysing the network protocol stack used by the operating system. 
Running services are usually identified by attempting to connect to a host's ports. Port scanners are 
programs that an attacker can use to automate this process. Basic port scanners work by connecting to 
every TCP port on a host and reporting back which ports were open. More sophisticated port scanners, 
such as Nmap[48], use additional techniques to avoid detection and to gain more infmmation. 
Mapping identifies potential targets, such as a version 6.0 liS web server, but specific vulnerabilities 
that could be exploited are not identified. Either the attacker has to choose an attack using the information 
gathered, or more infmmation needs to be gathered through security scanning, discussed below. 
3.10.3 Security Scanning 
Security scanning is similar to mapping, but is more active and more information is gathered. Security 
scanning involves testing a host for known vulnerabilities or weaknesses that could be exploited by the 
attacker. For example, a security scanning tool may be able to tell the attacker that port 80 of the tar-
get is mnning an HTTP server, with a specific vulnerability. Security scanning is more easily detected 
than mapping, as attack pattems testing the vulnerabilities can usually be detected by intmsion detection 
systems. 
3.11 Blended Attacks 
While blended attacks are not a new development, they have recently become popular with attacks such 
as Code Red and Nimda. Blended attacks are attacks that contain multiple threats, for example multiple 
means of propagation or multiple attack payloads. Many of the attacks mentioned previously in this chapter 
can be considered as blended. 
The first instance of a blended attack occurred in 1988 with the first Intemet worm: the Morris Wmm. 
The Morris Wmm attacked and propagated through multiple vulnerabilities in Unix based systems. Newer 
attacks such as Code Red and Nimda work in a similar way by exploiting multiple vulnerabilities and by 
launching multiple attacks. For in-depth analysis of the Morris Worm see [38, 67]. 
Code Red[23] is the most famous blended attack. It was the first of the new wave ofblended attacks 
and it came as a surprise to the security industry. Code Red was also the first wonn to spread through 
memory rather than through file uploads. Microsoft's Intemet Infmmation Services (liS) web server was 
Code Red's target liS versions from 4.0 to 6.0b all contained a buffer overflow vulnerability[22] in the 
Indexing Service DLL of liS. Code Red spread by using a buffer overflow to compromise susceptible hosts 
and once a host was infected, Code Red would do the following, depending on which day of the month it 
was: 
• Day 1- 19: Code Red would try to spread by attempting to connect to vulnerable hosts. 
• Day 20 27: A denial of service attack would be launched against a fixed IP address. 
• Day 28- end ofrnonth: No activity. 
Code Red is a blended attack as it is a wmm that utilises a buffer overflow attack and launches a denial 
of service attack. Three separate attacks are combined together to produce a dangerous blended attack. 
Code Red is discussed futiher in [9, 75]. 
Blended attacks have become one of the leading security threats and will no doubt continue to be a 
significant problem in the future. While blended attacks have existed for some time, a new wave of highly 
damaging attacks started with the release of Code Red. The Intemet is especially susceptible to blended 
threats, as was shown by the recent SQL Slammer[27] attack, in which the Intemet suffered a significant 
loss of petfmmance. 
18 Services sometimes display the operating system name and version in a welcome banner. 
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Chapter 4 
Toward a Taxonomy 
In this chapter the taxonomy is proposed. Before describing the taxonomy, the requirements for the taxon-
omy and previous work in this field are discussed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. Finally, Section 4.3 details the 
process of creating the taxonomy as well as how the taxonomy works. 
4.1 Requirements of a Taxonomy 
Before examining existing taxonomies and working toward a new one, it is important to define what a good 
taxonomy consists of. In other words, what are its requirements? For a taxonomy to be useful it has to 
meet some basic requirements. If, for example, it is not repeatable, then the taxonomy would fail to be 
useful. Therefore, it is crucial that the taxonomy's requirements are defined. A number of requirements 
that have been compiled from various sources in [56), provide a good starting point. Below are some of the 
requirements that are relevant to the proposed taxonomy: 
• Accepted[ 4, 44): The taxonomy should be structured so that it can be become generally approved. 
• Comprehensible[ 55]: A comprehensible taxonomy will be able to be understood by those who are in 
the security field, as well as those who only have an interest in it. 
• Completeness[ 4] /Exhaustive[ 44, 55]: For a taxonomy to be complete/exhaustive', it should account 
for all possible attacks and provide categories for them. While it is hard to prove a taxonomy is 
complete or exhaustive, they can be justified through the successful categorisation of actual attacks. 
• Determinism[52]: The procedure of classifying must be clearly defined. 
• Mutua!ly exclusive[ 44, 55): A mutually exclusive taxonomy will categorise each attack into, at most, 
one category. 
• Repeatable[ 44, 52]: Classifications should be repeatable. 
• Terminology complying with established security terminology [55] : Existing tenninology should be 
used in the taxonomy so as to avoid confusion and to build on previous knowledge. 
• Terms well defined[ 12]: There should be no confusion as to what a te1m means. 
• Unambiguous[44, 55]: Each category of the taxonomy must be clearly defined so that there is no 
ambiguity as to where an attack should be classified. 
• Usefii/[44, 55]: A useful taxonomy will be able to be used in the security industry. For example, the 
taxonomy should be able to be used by incident response teams. 
The taxonomy is proposed later on in this chapter. In Chapter 5 the taxonomy is tested against the 
above requirements. 
1 Completeness and exhaustiveness are essentially the same requirement. 
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4.2 Existing Taxonomies and Previous Work 
The field of network and computer security has seen a number of taxonomies aimed at classifying attacks. 
In the following section some of the more prominent taxonomies will be examined. 
4.2.1 Early Security Taxonomies 
The two most important early taxonomies in the security field were the Protection Analysis[ 4 7] (PA) tax-
onomy and the Research in Secured Operating Systems[2] (RISOS). While they focus on vulnerabilities 
rather than attacks, they provide a good background to proposing new taxonomies. Both focused on cate-
gmising security flaws and both resulted in similar classification schemes. Each consisted of a number of 
classes that are roughly equivalent. 
As Bishop points out in [10], both taxonomies suffer from ambiguity between the classes. Some vul-
nerabilities may fall across multiple classes and therefore the taxonomies will not be mutually exclusive. 
However, the concepts from these early taxonomies are valuable, and have been used in newer taxonomies 
([56, 11, 7]). Comparisons of the two taxonomies can be found in [11, 10, 56]. 
4.2.2 Bishop's Vulnerability Taxonomy 
Matt Bishop has made several important contributions to the field of security taxonomies. In [ 11 ], Bishop 
presents a taxonomy of Unix vulnerabilities in which the underlying flaws of vulnerabilities are used to 
create a classification scheme. Six "axes'.' are used to classify vulnerabilities: 
• Nature: The nature of the flaw is described using the Protection Analysis categories. 
o Time of introduction: When the vulnerability was introduced. 
• Exploitation Domain: What is gained through the exploitation. 
111 Effect Domain: What can be affected by the vulnerability. 
111 Minimum Number: The minimum number of components necessa1y to exploit the vulnerability. 
111 Source: The source of identification of the vulnerability. 
Bishop's approach is interesting, as instead of a flat or tree-like taxonomy, he uses axes. In the proposed 
taxonomy a similar structure is used as described in Section 4.3. 
Bishop also prefmmed a critical analysis of other vulnerability taxonomies in [10]. Previous tax-
onomies such as PA, RISOS and Aslam's taxonomy[?] are assessed and compared. He also examines 
the issues sulTounding taxonomies and especially what makes a good taxonomy. Bishop suggests that one 
of the main benefits of a taxonomy is that it should help to work out where to invest resources. 
4.2.3 Howard's Taxonomy 
In [44], John Howard presents a taxonomy of computer and network attacks. The approach taken is broad 
and process-based, taking into account factors such as attacker motivation and objectives. 
Figure 4.1 shows Howard's taxonomy. The taxonomy consists of five stages: attackers, tools, access, 
results and objectives. The attackers consist of a range of types of people who may launch an attack. These 
range from hackers to tenorists. Tools are the means that the attackers use to gain access. Access is gained 
through either an implementation, design or configuration vulnerability. Once access is gained, the results 
may be achieved such as corruption or disclosure of information. From this process the attacker achieves 
their objectives which may vary from inflicting damage, to gaining status. 
In rega1·ds to the computer and network attack taxonomy that is suggested in Section 4.3, the tools stage 
of Howard's taxonomy is roughly analogous. The proposed taxonomy is focused solely on the attacks, 
rather than the attack process. 
Howard attempts to focus attention on a process driven taxonomy, rather than a classification scheme 
such as in the animal kingdom. This means the whole attack process is considered, which is certainly 
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taluable. However, as Lough points out in [56], Howard fails to meet one of his taxonomy requirements: 
mutual exclusion. Some of the categories shmvn in Figure 4.1 may overlap. For example the attacker's 
categmy contains classes that may not be mutually exclusive. As Lough points out: 
"Depending on one's point of view, a terrorist's actions could be indistinguishable from those 
of a vandal. A 51JY could be a professional criminal." 
Howard's approach is still useful in gaining insight to the process of attacks. However, for information 
bodies such as CERT, such a taxonomy may not be practical. Information bodies are more concemed with 
the attack itself, than with the motivations and objectives behind it. 
Some of Howard's ideas have been applied in the proposed taxonomy, notably in the third (Section 
4.4.3) and fourth (Section 4.4.4) dimensions of the proposed taxonomy. 
Howard extends his work further in [45] by refining some of the stages. However, the problems men-
tioned above still exist with the refined taxonomy. 
Figure 4.1: Howru·d's Process Based Taxonomy. 
4.2.4 Lough's Taxonomy 
In 2001, Daniel Lough proposed another taxonomy named VERDICT[56]. VERDICT stands for Validation 
Exposure Randomness Deallocation Improper Conditions Taxonomy and is based on characteristics of 
attacks. Instead of a tree-like taxonomy, Lough proposed using four characteristics of attacks: 
• Improper Validation: Insufficient or inconect validation results in unauthorised access to infonnation 
or a system. 
• Improper Exposure: A system or infmmation is improperly exposed to attack. 
• Improper Randomness: Insufficient randomness results in exposure to attack. 
• Improper Deallocation: Inf01mation is not properly deleted after use and thus can be vulnerable to 
attack. 
Lough proposes that any attack can be classified using these four characteristics. By basing the taxonomy 
on characteristics, the taxonomy can easily and tidily classify blended attacks. Lough's approach is similar 
to both Bishop's axes and to the proposed taxonomy's dimensions. 
Lough's taxonomy is interesting and has influenced the proposed taxonomy. However, there are a few 
short comings to Lough's taxonomy. While it is useful for applying to a new technology (Lough applies it 
to 802.11 and finds numerous vulnerabilities) to discover new vulnerabilities and to classify existing ones, 
it may be helpful to have a more specific taxonomy. 
In tetms of an information body, Lough's taxonomy may not be useful for the day to day task of 
identifying and classifying new attacks, and issuing advisories. Lough's taxonomy is general, and does not 
speak about attacks in tetms ofwonns, viruses, and trojans, which is how attacks are usually described. 
In the end, the goals of the taxonomy detetmine its usefulness. The proposed taxonomy aims to be 
a practical, specific taxonomy that can be used by infotmation bodies to classify new attacks. Lough's 
taxonomy on the other hand, succeeds in providing a taxonomy that is useful for analysis and for the 
prediction of new attacks. 
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4.2.5 OASIS Web Application Security Technical Committee 
The OASIS Web Application Security Technical Committee[72] (OASIS WAS TC) is a cunent attempt 
to provide a classification scheme for web application vulnerabilities. It is a new initiative with the first 
meeting on 3 July 2003. Cunently it is being developed and is in the early stages of being drafted. OASIS 
WAS TC is leaning toward using attack vectors as the first step of classification, in a similar way to what is 
suggested in the proposed taxonomy2. XML is being used to describe vulnerabilities so that interoperability 
is enhanced. 
It will be interesting to see how the OASIS WAS TC progresses over the next few years. While still in 
its early stages, it has produced some good ideas and there is active discussion on the committee's mailing 
lists[73]. 
4.3 The Proposed Taxonomy 
While the taxonomies discussed in the previous section are useful, they tend to be general in their approach 
to classifying attacks. Taxonomies such as Howard's (Section 4.2.3) give a good overview of the attack 
process, but avoid examining the categories of attacks that face computers and networks each day. For 
example, classifying attacks such as the Code Red wonn would be hard to do using Howard's taxonomy. 
Therefore, there is a need for a taxonomy that allows for specific kinds of computer and network attacks, 
such as wonns, viruses and buffer overflows. The goal is to provide a pragmatic taxonomy that is useful to 
those dealing with attacks on a regular basis. 
During the taxonomy's development, several model taxonomies were attempted without success. The 
initial approach was to create a taxonomy analogous to the animal kingdom's taxonomy. The resulting 
taxonomy would be a tree-like structure with the more general categories at the top, and specific categories 
at the leaves. However, while such a taxonomy is certainly desirable, in practise it is not possible to do so 
in an acceptable manner. 
The first problem with such a taxonomy is how to deal with blended attacks. To allow for attacks to 
contain other attacks there are two possible solutions. One is to allow for cross-tree references, that is when 
one leaf node points to another leaf node somewhere else in the taxonomy. This approach leads to a messy 
tree and would be hard to use in classifying. The second is to have recursive trees, so that each leaf on the 
base tree may have another tree (or more) under it. This again leads to a messy structure and would be of 
limited use. 
The second problem is that attacks, unlike animals, often do not have many common traits. This 
makes the creation of broad categories hard. While wonns and viruses can be related3 , there is little in 
common between them and a buffer-overflow. This means that the taxonomy tree would have to branch 
out immediately into a number of categories that are unrelated. The benefits of the tree-like structure are 
therefore lost. With these two problems, the tree-like taxonomy was discarded. 
Another way taxonomies are sometimes created, is through lists. A list based taxonomy contains a fiat-
list of categories. There are two approaches that could have been taken in the proposed taxonomy. Firstly, 
a fiat-list with general categories could be suggested, or secondly, a fiat-list with very specific categories 
could be proposed. The problem with the first case is that general categories are of limited use. In the 
domain of network and computer attacks, the categories would have to be very general to accommodate the 
problem of blended attacks. Such a general taxonomy will not be vety useful. The second case also suffers 
from the problem of blended attacks. If very specific categories were chosen, such that any type of blended 
attack had a categmy, the list would become almost infinite, with few instances within each categmy. 
The proposed taxonomy takes a different approach than both the tree-like taxonomy or the fiat-list 
taxonomy. However, both these approaches are used by the proposed taxonomy as parts of the complete 
taxonomy. The next section explains this in detail. 
2The idea of attack vectors for the taxonomy, was explored before researching the OASIS WAS TC. 
3 As both are self-replicating. 
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4.3.1 Overview 
The proposed taxonomy works by using the concept of dimensions. Dimensions are a way of allowing 
for a classification of an attack to take a more holistic view of the attack. The taxonomy proposes four 
dimensions for attack classification. Before examining how the taxonomy works, the dimensions used are 
briefly explained. 
The first, or base, dimension is used to categorise the attack into an attack class that is based on the 
attack vector, or if there is no attack vector, the attack is classified into the closest category. 
The attack target is covered in the second dimension. The target can be classified down to very specific 
targets, such as Sendmail 8.12.10 or can cover a class of targets, such as Unix based systems. 
The third dimension covers the vulnerabilities and exploits, if they exist, that the attack uses. The 
vulnerabilities and exploits do not have a stmctured classification due to the possible infinite number of 
vulnerabilities and exploits. Instead the list defined by the Common Vulnerabilities Exposures project[34] 
is used as a starting point 
The fourth dimension takes into account the possibility for an attack to have a payload or effect beyond 
itself. In many cases an attack will be clearly a certain kind of attack, but yet it will have a payload or cause 
an effect that is different. For example, a vims that installs a trojan horse, is still clearly a vims, but has a 
trojan as a payload. 
In each dimension, the classifier must classify attacks as specifically as possible. This means attacks 
should be classified down to the smallest sub-class in each dimension that makes sense. 
The taxonomy allows for the possibility of further dimensions which, although not necessary, may 
enhance the knowledge of the attack Some further dimensions are discussed in Section 4.4.5. 
An attack must have at least the first dimension, but depending on the attack, or how specific the 
classifier wishes to be, all, some or none of the other dimensions may be used. The next section explains 
the details of each dimension and how they work to provide a classification. 
4.4 Classification 
4.4.1 The First Dimension 
Classification in the first dimension consists of two options: 
• If the attack uses an attack vector, categorise by the vector. 
• Otherwise find the most appropriate category, using the descriptions for each category below. 
The attack vector of an attack is the main means in which the attack reaches its target. For example, 
the Melissa "Virus" uses email as its main form of propagation, and therefore is, in the first dimension, a 
mass-mailing wo1m. The vims-like capabilities of Melissa are handled in the other dimensions. 
It is very important that attack vectors are identified if possible, as they provide the most accurate 
description of an attack. For example, an attack that infects computers through a TCP network service and 
then installs a trojan on the infected computer, should be classified by its attack vector- which is a wmm 
(it spreads through via network services). If it is classified as a trojan instead, then there is no opportunity 
to describe the worm-like behaviour of the attack, which is essentially the most important feature of the 
attack. 
If an attack vector is not present or is too trivial4 then the attack can be categorised by finding the 
categoty closest to how the attack works. For example, an attack mn locally that gains control of another 
process by overflowing a buffer, is a buffer overflow. 
4That is, the vector is outside the categories defined in the first dimension. 
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Table 4.1: The First Dimension's Categories 
Viruses: 
Wmms: 
Trojans: 
Buffer Overflows: 
Denial of Service Attacks: 
Network Attacks: 
Physical Attacks: 
Password Attacks: 
File Infectors 
System/Boot Record Infectors 
Macro 
Mass Mailing 
Network Aware 
Logic Bombs 
Stack 
Heap 
Host Based: 
Network Based: 
Distributed 
Sp?ofing 
Session Hijacking 
Wireless Attacks: 
Web Application Attacks: 
Basic 
Energy Weapon: 
VanEck 
Guessing: 
Exploiting Implementation 
Information Gathering Attacks: Sniffing: 
Mapping 
Security Scanning 
Resource Hogs 
Crashers 
TCP Flooding 
UDP Flooding 
ICMP Flooding 
WEP Cracking 
Cross Site Scripting 
Parameter Tampering 
Cookie Poisoning 
Database Attacks 
Hidden Field Manipulation 
HERF 
LERF 
EMP 
Brute Force 
Dictionary Attack 
Packet Sniffing 
Chapter 3 gives more detail on each of the categories shown in Table 4 .1. However, to help categorise 
attacks if they do not have an obvious attack vector, the following definitions are given. When categorising, 
choose the the category that matches best with the definitions below. Once the general class has been 
chosen, the attack may be further classified by using the sub-classes, if they exist. See Chapter 3 for more 
infmmation on each of the sub-classes. 
• Virus: Self-replicating program that propagates through some fmm of infected files. 
• Worms: Self-replicating program that propagates without using infected files. Usually worms prop-
agate through network services on computers or through email. 
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• Trojans: A program made to appear benign that serves some malicious purpose. 
• Buffer Overflorvs: A process that gains control or crashes another process by overflowing the other 
process' buffer. 
• Denial of Service Attacks: An attack which prevents legitimate users from accessing or using a host 
or network. 
• Netrvork Attacks: Attacks focused on attacking a network or the users on the network by manipulat-
ing network protocols, ranging from the data-link layer to the application layer. 
• Physical Attacks: Attacks based on damaging physical components of a network or computer. 
• Password Attacks: Attacks aimed at gaining a password. 
• Information Gathering Attacks: Attacks in which no physical or digital damage is done and no 
subversion occurs, but in which important infmmation is gained by the attacker, possibly to be used 
in a further attack. 
The first dimension is summarised in Table 4.1. The categories are reasonably broad. To categorise 
more specifically, other dimensions need to be used. 
The categories that can be used as attack vectors are: viruses, worms and trojans. These categories 
have the necessary characteristics5 to be vectors. While it may not be impossible to use another category as 
an attack vector, it should be a rare occunence and would suggest that an incmTect classification has been 
made. 
4.4.2 The Second Dimension 
The second dimension covers the target(s) of the attack. As an attack may have multiple targets, there may 
be multiple entries in this dimension. 
It is important to note that targets should be made specific. That is, for an attack on Server A, we are 
not concerned that Server A was attacked. Rather the operating system of Server A and service that was 
attacked are important. So for example, if Code Red attacked Server A, the target would not be Server A, 
but the liS server that Server A was running. 
Table 4.2 shows the categories of the second dimension. Note that Table 4.2 is not complete. There are 
a wide range of potential targets and each year the list increases. Instead, what is presented is a generalised 
way of classifying the targets with a few specific examples. The entries in Table 4.2 that contain" ... " 
show where extra categories can be added to the classification. Extra entries should be added in a way that 
confmms with how the sibling categories have been defined. For example, if adding a categmy for the DOS 
operating system, firstly a "DOS Family" entry should be created under Software--tOperating System, then 
the flavours of DOS should be created within the "DOS Family" entry. Finally, within each flavour of DOS 
entry, specific versions should be created. 
Hardware targets can be put into three main sub-classes: computer, network equipment and peripheral 
devices. Computer targets are computer components, such as CPUs and hard-disks. Network equipment 
targets are network hardware such as hubs, or network cable. Finally, peripheral devices are devices that 
are not essential6 to a computer, for example monitors. 
Software targets have two main classes: operating system and application targets. Operating system 
targets are targets within the operating system itself, while application targets are targets that are running 
on top of the operating system. 
Finally, a network target is when the network itself or its protocols are targeted. For example, a ping-
flood attacks a network rather than hardware or software. 
5 Such as having lhe ability to cany other attacks. 
6 Essential devices are ones that the computer could not operate without. For example, the CPU and memmy are essential. 
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Table 4.2: The Second Dimension's Categories 
Hardware: Computer: Hard-disks 
Network Equipment: Hub 
Cabling 
Peripheral Devices: Monitor 
Keyboard 
Software: Operating System: Windows Family: Windows XP 
Windows 2003 Server 
Unix Family: Linux: 
FreeBSD: 
MacOS Family: MacOSX: 
Application: Server: Database 
Email: 
Web: 
User: Wordprocesor: 
Email Client 
Network: Protocols: Transport-Layer: IP 
Network-Layer: TCP 
4.4.3 The Third Dimension 
2.2 
2.4 
4.8 
5.1 
10.1 
10.2 
US: 
MS Word: 
4.0 
5.0 
2000 
XP 
The third dimension covers the vulnerabilities and exploits that the attack uses. An attack may exploit 
multiple vulnerabilities, so there may be more than one ently in the third' dimension. Entries in the third 
dimension are usually a Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ently, but in the case that a CVE 
ent1y does not exist, the vulnerability is classified generally as described later on in this section. 
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project[34] is designed to produce common definitions 
of vulnerabilities. The idea for CVE was proposed by Mann and Christey in [58]. The CVE project has 
become the de facto standard for vulnerabilities and so it is desirable that the proposed taxonomy utilises 
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this. It should be noted that vulnerabilities are wide and varied and usually apply to specific versions of a 
piece of software or operating systems. This means a classification scheme would have to include every 
piece of software in use today. 
Below is an example of a CVE ently showing a vulnerability in Microsoft Internet Infmmation Services 
which the Code Red wmm exploited. 
Name: CVE-2001-0500 
Description: Buffer overflow in ISAPI extension (idq.dll) in Index Server 2.0 and 
Indexing Service 2000 in liS 6.0 beta and earlier allows remote attackers to execute 
arbitrmy commands via a long argument to Internet Data Administration (.ida) and 
Internet Data Quety (.idq) files such as default.ida, as commonly exploited by Code Red. 
References: 
• BUGTRAQ 1: 20010618 All versions of Microsoft Internet Information Services, 
• Remote buffer overflow (SYSTEM Level Access) 
• MS2: MSOl-033 
• CERT3 : CA-2001-13 
• BID4 : 2880 
• XF5: iis-isapi-idq-bo( 6705) 
• CIAC6 :L-098 
Figure 4.2: CVE Ently: CVE-2001-0500 
Once the vulnerability or vulnerabilities that an attack exploits are known, the relevant CVE entries can 
be found. Howard suggests three general types of vulnerabilities in [ 44]: 
• Vulnerability in implementation: The design of the system is secure, but the implementation fails to 
meet the design and thus vulnerabilities are introduced. 
• Vulnerability in design: The fundamental design of the system is flawed, so that even a perfect 
implementation will have vulnerabilities. 
• Vulnerability in configuration: The configuration of the system introduces vulnerabilities. The sys-
tem itself may be secure but if configured incorrectly, renders itself vulnerable. 
If no CVE ently exists, then one of Howard's types of vulnerabilities should be selected, and a description 
of the vulnerability should be created. As time progresses, CVE entries may be added, in which case 
classifications may have to be updated to reflect this. 
1 BUGTRAQ mailing list (http: I /www. securityfocus. com/archive/ 1). 
2Microsoft Security Bulletin (http: I /www. microsoft. com/security /bulletins/ current. asp). 
3CERT/CC Advisoty (http: I /www. cert. org/advisories). 
4Security Focus Bugtraq ID database entty (http: I /online. securi tyfocus. com/bid). 
5X-Force Vulnerability Database (http: I /xforce. iss .net). 
6 Depmiment of Energy Computer Incident Advismy Center bulletins (http: I I ciac. llnl. gov I cgi-bin/ index/ 
bulletins) 
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4.4.4 The Fourth Dimension 
The third dimension deals with attacks having payloads or effects beyond themselves. For example, a 
wotm may have a trojan payload, or it may simply destroy some files. The payload may be another attack 
itself and so the first dimension can be used to classify the payload if this is the case. 
The fourth dimension consists of five categories: 
1. First Dimension Attack Payload (see Section 4.4.1) 
2. Conuption of Infmmation 
3. Disclosure oflnfmmation 
4. Theft of Service 
5. Subversion 
Categories 2-4 were previously identified by Howard in [ 44]. Conuption of infmmation occurs when a 
payload conupts or destroys some information. When a payload discloses information that is not intended 
by the victim to be disclosed, the payload is a disclosure of infmmation payload. Theft of service payloads 
use a system's services without authorisation, but without impacting the service oflegitimate users. Howard 
has a fourth category, denial of service. However, this possibility is covered in Categmy 1. Finally, a 
subversion payload will gain control over part of the target and use it for its own use. 
It should be noted that apart from the ,First Dimension Attack Payload, the categories are general. This 
is because while general types of payloads can be identified, there are a wide range of implementations of 
the various payloads. For example, two attacks may corrupt information in that they delete files, but may 
only differ in which files they delete. In most cases it should be possible to use a first dimension categmy 
as the payload. 
4.4.5 Other Dimensions 
Besides the four dimensions described above, a number of further dimensions could be added to enhance 
the taxonomy. Several are discussed below and although they are more abstract and are not as essential as 
the previous dimensions, they are still useful in classifying attacks, especially in regards to how to react to 
a new attack that falls into a certain category. 
For example, the following are dimensions that would be useful for an organisation dealing with attacks: 
• Damage: A damage dimension would attempt to measure the amount of damage that the attack 
does. Attacks have different degrees of damage. An attack such as the recent SoBig virus 7 cause 
more damage than a simple virus such as the Infector virus (see Section 3.2.1). 
• Cost: Cleaning up after an attack costs money. In some cases billions of dollars are spent on attack 
recovety. 
• Propagation: This categmy applies more to replicating attacks. The propagation of an attack is the 
speed at which it reproduces or spreads. For attacks such as wonns and vimses, a dimension covering 
this aspect would be useful. 
• Defence: The methods in how an attack has been defended against could be made into a further 
defence dimension. 
It should be noted that the new dimensions suggested above are post-attack dimensions. That is, the 
attack will have to have had time to show its attack potential, so that an accurate assessment of the damage 
or cost can be made. The four base dimensions however, can be applied relatively soon after the attack has 
been launched. There is also the possibility for classification refinement, so that as more infonnation is 
known about an attack, the classification is made more specific. 
7 And it's variants. 
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Chapter 5 
Evaluation of the Proposed Taxonomy 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to briefly evaluate the taxonomy proposed in Chapter 4. Before starting 
the taxonomy, a list of requirements (see Section 4.1) were compiled from the literature that the taxonomy 
should ideally meet. These requirements are tested in this chapter. Also, a number of attacks were classified 
using the proposed taxonomy, to show how the taxonomy is applied practically. Appendix A contains the 
classifications that were made. 
Section 5.2 examines the classification process to see how the proposed taxonomy works in practise 
and whether or not the requirements are met. In Section 5.3, future work is described, detailing how the 
taxonomy could be improved and what areas would be interesting to research fu1iher. 
5.2 Analysis 
Before examining the requirements that the taxonomy is supposed to meet, a brief analysis of the classi-
fication process is given. In general, it was found the taxonomy worked well and that most attacks were 
easily (with the appropriate infonnation) classified. 
However, there were a number of issues that were identified: 
• Blended Attacks: While the taxonomy deals with blended attacks well, some blended attacks (espe-
cially Nimda) were hard to classify. This was due to the complexity of the attacks as they contained 
multiple sub-attacks. 
• Targets: The second (target) dimension overall worked well. However, in some cases it was hard to 
detennine what the target was. For example, a worm like Nimda attacks specific versions oflntemet 
Explorer (IE) but email clients were affected the most1• However, as described in Section 4.4.2, 
attacks must made specific, that is, it is the specific versions of IE that are being attacked and not the 
email clients. 
• Blended Sub-Attacks: One problem occurred when classifying the Melissa attack. The Melissa attack 
contains a macro virus payload in a Microsoft Word document. The document is a trojan in the sense 
that it appears to be benign. The taxonomy was unable to account for both the payload being a virus 
and a trojan. However, the main feature of the payload is that it is a virus, therefore Melissa was 
categorised in the fomth dimension as a macro vims. 
• Ranges: Ranges of classifications, especially in the second (target) dimension could be handled 
better. Ranges such as DOS versions 2.4 to 4.1 require every DOS version in the range to be added 
to the classification. 
1 As many email clients use IE lo view HTML emails. 
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• Requirements: One problem that the taxonomy cannot handle fully is when an attack requires a 
combination of targets to be successful. For example, an attack may require that a certain operating 
system run a certain service. If the service and operating system are not in the cetiain combination, 
then the attack fails. Thus, there is a relationship between the two targets. This relationship is 
cunently not accounted for, so in the above situation, each target will simply be listed in the second 
dimension. The same problem exists for the third (vulnerabilities) dimension. 
5.2.1 Requirements 
In Section 4.1, a number of requirements were defined that the proposed taxonomy should meet. In this 
section, those requirements are re-examined in regards to the proposed taxonomy to see whether or not the 
taxonomy meet the requirements. 
Accepted 
For the proposed taxonomy to be accepted, it should be structured so that the general security community 
is able to accept it. The proposed taxonomy builds on previous work that is well accepted in the security 
community, and utilises projects, such as the CVE, that are well respected. While it remains to be seen if 
the proposed taxonomy is accepted, it is certainly acceptable. Improvements described in Section 5.3, will 
futiher make the proposed taxonomy acceptable to the security community. 
Comprehensible 
A comprehensible taxonomy is one that can be understood by both security experts, and those with a slight 
interest in the field. Generally the taxonomy is comprehensible: the splitting of attacks into four dimensions 
separates the attack into understandable components. 
However, there are some areas which could be improved. It would be preferable to have names that 
accurately described each dimension, rather than labelling each dimension with a number. While this 
is straight-forward for dimensions two to four: Target, Vulnerability and Payload respectively; the base 
dimension presents more of a problem. The base dimension classifies the attack payload or the most 
striking feature of the attack, and so naming it is non-trivial. 
Completeness/Exhaustive 
Completeness a hard requirement to prove. A range of attacks were categorised in the above sections, and 
although only a few attacks are covered, they do help to show that the taxonomy is complete to a certain 
extent. However, the nature of the proposed taxonomy is that it can be extended. All current types of 
attacks are covered, and if new ones are introduced, then the taxonomy can be extended to cover them. The 
taxonomy is flexible in this sense, so can be adapted if found not to be complete. 
Determinism 
The procedure by which classification occurs is clearly defined in Chapter 4. However, it was noticed that 
while classifying attacks, sometimes it was hard to determine what the attack consisted of. For example, 
when an attack had no obvious attack vector, then sometimes it was difficult to detetmine which category 
was the closest. However, the difficulty was not major and after some thought it became clear which was 
the appropriate category. 
Mutually Exclusive 
Mutually exclusiveness means that each attack can only be categorised into, at most, one categmy. The 
proposed taxonomy, through the defined procedure, does not allow for attacks to be categorised into multi-
ple categories. It does however allow for the refinement of a classification. So an attack may be categorised 
generally initially, but as more infmmation about the attack becomes evident, the categorisation can be 
refined. However, at no tin1e should the same attack be classified in two difierent ways. 
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Repeatable 
Repeatability means that classifications of an attack should be repeatable. This requirement links in 
strongly with detetminism. If the procedure is clearly defined, then the taxonomy should be repeatable. As 
the procedure is defined carefully, in most instances classifications will be repeatable. In the rare occasions 
where an attack is classified differently by different people, the procedure in Chapter 3 should be examined 
to find out which classification is correct. 
Terminology Complying with Established Security Terminology 
Security te1minology in regards to many types of computer attacks (especially viruses and wmms) is not 
well established. Sometimes one attack will be described as a wmm, while elsewhere it is described as a 
virus. The proposed taxonomy kept to commonly used terminology as much as possible, but where there 
was ambiguity, categories were specifically defined. The definitions will hopefully help in removing some 
of the ambiguity when certain attacks are described. 
The proposed taxonomy uses the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project as a basis 
for the third dimension. The CVE project is well established and provides tetminology for describing 
vulnerabilities. Thus, the taxonomy builds on existing terminology. 
Terms well defined 
In general the taxonomy's categories were found to be well defined. Given the procedure described in 
Section 4.3, identifying whether an attack had an attack vector or not, was relatively simple. One area that 
could be improved is the network attacks category. The definition used for this category is quite general, 
and a tighter definition would benefit the taxonomy. 
Unambiguous 
Unambiguity means that the taxonomy must have clearly defined classes. There should be no doubt as to 
which class an attack belongs to. The proposed taxonomy's use of dimensions means that classifications are 
less ambiguous as different aspects of attacks are covered in each dimension. Therefore, when classifying 
under the first dimension, the classifier only has to think about whether the attack has a vector and which 
class it is closest to. Thus, concerns are separated which means it is less likely that there will be ambiguity. 
Useful 
Usefulness is a requirement that cannot cunently be tested. For the proposed taxonomy to be useful, the 
security community must see it as useful and use it in some way. It remains to be seen whether or not this 
taxonomy will be useful. 
5.3 Future Work 
The proposed taxonomy is a good start toward a taxonomy for computer and network attacks. In general 
it works well, and attacks are easily categorised. However, as always, there is room for improvement. As 
described in the above sections, some requirements have not been fully met and some areas could do with 
refinement. 
A few problems were identified in Section 5.2. Blended attacks were sometimes difficult as they con-
tained numerous sub-attacks. The issue here is not so much the taxonomy, but how the blended attacks 
have been analysed and described. Sometimes blended attacks are analysed in a way that mixes sub-
attacks together. Therefore, the classifier must be able to sift through blended attack descliptions to find 
the information required. Future work in how to sift through attack descriptions would be helpful. 
Attacks that have targets (or vulnerabilities) that require other targets are not fully modelled in the tax-
onomy. It would be useful in future versions of the taxonomy to be able to relate items within a dimension 
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better. Relating items so that an attack can have a combination of targets that are required, rather than a list 
of targets that have no relationship, would be useful. 
To help understand classifications better, and to conelate attacks, some fmm of visualisation would 
be useful. Due to taxonomy having four dimensions, it is a non-trivial task. However, even if not all the 
infmmation contained within the dimensions is presented, some fmm of visualisation allowing correlation 
between attacks would be helpful. 
Research on how con·elation between attacks within the taxonomy would be interesting. The dimen-
sions allow for attacks to be con·elated through properties such as the vulnerabilities the attacks use. This 
means attacks that previously may have appeared to have nothing in common, can be related through one 
of the dimensions. More research could be done on how this works and how beneficial it could be. 
Further work could be done in moving the taxonomy toward a knowledge base approach. That is, as 
new classifications are created, they are added to a knowledge base. The knowledge base could detect 
conelations and allow for greater analysis of existing attacks. Another aspect would be the classification 
process. A step-by-step questionnaire could be used to ease classification. For example, the first few steps 
for classifying a wmm in the first dimension might consist of: 
• Is the attack self-replicating? (Yes= worm or virus, No= other 1st dimension attack) 
• Does the self-replicating attack propagate through infected files? (Yes= virus, No= wmm) 
• Does the wmm spread through email? (Yes= mass mailing wmm, No= network aware wmm) 
• 
This would continue until the wmm has been classified in the all dimensions and would make the process 
of classifying easier and reduce the chance of error. 
A more in-depth analysis of the taxonomy is required. While the above evaluation gives some idea 
of how well the taxonomy works, a more rigorous study should be conducted as future work. Further 
evaluation could include classifying a large number of attacks. If a knowledge base was implemented, 
artificial intelligence (AI) could be used to test the taxonomy using the knowledge base. The knowledge 
base could be leamt by the AI, then new attacks could be given to the AI to classify. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
Since the invention of computers and networks, people have found various ways to attack them. Attacks 
over the years have ranged from using a sledge hammer on a computer, to advanced distributed denial of 
service attacks. This research has focused on computer and network attacks and providing a taxonomy of 
them to help combat new attacks and to help computer and network security. 
Before examining the two main areas of research, attacks and the taxonomy, a brief introduction to 
the field of computer and network attacks was given in Chapter 2. Previous work done in this field was 
discussed, as well as where the field is at cun·erttly, in regards to recent developments. 
In Chapter 3, a wide range of computer and network attacks were discussed. This examination both 
helped to establish knowledge of attacks, which is helpful in combating attacks, as well as laying a foun-
dation down for proposing a taxonomy. A taxonomy requires knowledge of the area being classified, thus 
examining the attacks was crucial. 
The taxonomy was proposed in Chapter 4. Before proposing the taxonomy, existing taxonomies were 
examined and evaluated. Requirements for the taxonomy were also defined with the help of past research. 
The proposed taxonomy consists of four dimensions to provide a holistic approach to classifying attacks, 
and to deal with the problem of blended attacks. The first dimension covered the attack vector and the main 
behaviour of the attack. The second dimension allowed for classification of targets. Vulnerabilities were 
classified in the third dimension and payloads in the fourth. 
The proposed taxonomy does not provide a description of attacks. For that level of detail classifying 
bodies, such as CERTs, provide detailed descriptions of attacks. Instead, the proposed taxonomy provides 
a classification which can be used to correlate similar attacks. This correlation allows for knowledge from 
older attacks to be applied to new attacks. 
The taxonomy provides a common way of talking about attacks. Cunently attacks are often described 
in different ways by different organisations. Some attacks are called viruses at one organisation, while 
another describes them as worms. The proposed taxonomy will remove this ambiguity by providing a 
common means of classifying the attacks. 
In Chapter 5, the taxonomy was briefly examined and found to be, in general, a good way of classifying 
attacks. The requirements stated previously were re-examined and the taxonomy managed to meet most of 
them. A few improvements could be made which were suggested in Section 5.3. 
A taxonomy allows for better understanding of attacks, and better understanding allows for better de-
fence. Thus, the proposed taxonomy will benefit the security of networks and computers as it provides a 
more systematic way of understanding attacks. 
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Appendix A 
Classifications of Case Studies 
Table 5.2 shows the results of classifying a number of attacks using the proposed taxonomy. The table 
shows the first, second and fourth dimensions in full, but the second dimension has been tmncated to show 
only the final entry. So for example, Code Red's second dimension is Software --+ Application --+ Server 
--+ Web --+liS --+Versions 4, 5, and 6.0 beta, but only liS 4, 5 and 6.0 beta is shown. 
Also some entries are not complete, for example the Land attack has more than 40 different operating 
systems that it targets. Only a few of these are shown, but in a complete entry, all targets would be included. 
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Attack 
Blaster[28] 
Chemobyl[20] 
Code Red[23] 
John the Ripper'[63] 
Infector[8] 
Land[17] 
Melissa[ 19] 
Michelangelo[l5] 
Nimda[24] 
PKZIP 3 Trojan[64] 
Ramen[25] 
Slammer[27] 
Sobig.F[30] 
Wuarchive FTPDb[16] 
1st Dimension 
Network-Aware Worm 
File Infector Virus 
Network-Aware Worm 
Guessing Password Attack 
File Infector Virus 
CrasherDoS 
Mass-Mailing Worm 
System/Boot Record Infector Vrrus 
Mass-Mailing Worm 
Trojan 
Network-Aware Worm 
Network-Aware Worm 
Mass-Mailing Worm 
Trojan 
a John the Ripper is a password cracking program. 
bVersions 2.2 and 2.lf. 
Table A.1: Classification Results 
2nd Dimension 3rd Dimension 
MS Windows NT 4.0, CAN-2003-0352 
2000, XP, Server 2003 
MS Windows 95 & 98 
liS 4, 5, & 6.0 beta CVE-2001-0500 
Unix Family, 
Windows NT, 2002 & XP 
DOS Family 
Windows 95 and NT 4.0, 
Windows for Workgroups 
3.11, ... 
Microsoft Word 97 & 
Word2000 
DOS Family 
MS IE 5.5 SPl & 
earlier except 5.01 SP2 
MSDOS 
Redhat 6.2 & 7.0 
MS SQL Server 2000 
Email Client 
Unix Family 
Configuration 
CVE-1999-00 16 
Configuration 
CVE-2001-0333 & 
CVE-2001-0154 
CVE-2000-0573, 
CVE-2000-0666 & 
CVE-2000-0917 
CAN-2002-0649 
Configuration 
4th Dimension 
TCP packet flooding DoS 
Corruption of Information 
Stack Buffer Overflow 
& TCP packet flooding DoS. 
Disclosure of Information 
Host Based Crasher DoS 
Macro Virus & TCP packet flooding DoS 
Corruption of Information 
File Infector Virus, Trojan & 
DoS 
Corruption oflnformation 
Host-based DoS, 
UDP & TCP packet flooding DoS & 
Subversion 
Stack Buffer Overflow 
& UDP packet flooding DoS 
Trojan 
Subversion 
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